Changes between Version 4 and Version 5 of Security considerations


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Timestamp:
04/30/25 10:46:40 (3 weeks ago)
Author:
enno
Comment:

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  • Security considerations

    v4 v5  
    9898You should treat the Guix channel, source transport, build environment, and auditability as a single trusted pipeline.
    9999
    100 == Summary Table: Guix vs. Commercial OS Platforms in Air-Gapped Environments
     100[[Guix vs. Commercial OS Platforms in Air-Gapped Environments]]
    101101
    102 || Feature / Concern || Guix System || RHEL / Windows (Commercial Vendors) ||
    103 || Reproducible builds || Full functional package manager with bit-for-bit reproducibility || Rare, not the default; often impossible to verify ||
    104 || Declarative system configuration || Entire OS and services declared in one file (config.scm) || Partial via kickstart (RHEL) or Group Policy (Windows) ||
    105 || Source-based verification || Build everything from source with pinned hashes || Can build some packages from source (e.g. SRPMs), but not guaranteed or easy ||
    106 || Transparent dependency graph || guix graph, complete dependency visibility || Opaque; relies on vendor tooling or trust ||
    107 || Custom internal repositories || Simple to set up private channels or mirrors || Possible but complex (e.g., Satellite, WSUS, SCCM) ||
    108 || Air-gap support (by design) || Built-in tools for exporting and importing sources (guix archive) || Requires extra software and policies ||
    109 || System rollback and audit trail || Native support for generations and rollbacks || Possible with snapshots or backups; not reproducible ||
    110 || Security patching control || You control exactly when and how updates are applied; reproducible || Updates are controlled by vendor timelines or manual QA workflows ||
    111 || Proprietary trust requirement || No vendor black-box binaries required || Trust required in vendor-signed binaries ||
    112 || Compliance alignment (e.g., CIS, STIG) || Manual setup, but full control || Vendor-provided baselines, common in regulated environments ||
    113 || Support & certification || Community or niche consulting || Enterprise support, certifications (Common Criteria, etc.) ||
    114 
    115 == Security & Supply Chain Control
    116 
    117 Guix System:
    118 You can inspect, audit, and rebuild every component of your system — from the kernel to applications — using cryptographically pinned source inputs.
    119 The entire dependency graph is traceable and reproducible, even across machines and time.
    120 Perfectly suited for classified or national security work, where vendor trust cannot be assumed.
    121 RHEL / Windows:
    122 You receive pre-built binaries signed by the vendor.
    123 You often trust opaque CI/CD systems outside your control.
    124 Reproducing or auditing software at a fine-grained level is non-trivial or impossible.
    125 
    126 == Tooling and Maintenance
    127 
    128 Guix:
    129 You define everything declaratively — no surprises at runtime.
    130 You can script, version-control, and diff system changes like source code.
    131 Integration with CI/CD is powerful but requires Scheme fluency and a Unix mindset.
    132 RHEL / Windows:
    133 You use vendor tools (e.g., Satellite, WSUS, SCCM) to manage updates and installations.
    134 Configuration drift is common without complex tools like Ansible, Puppet, or GPO.
    135 More user-friendly, but less introspectable.
    136 
    137 == Air-Gap Suitability
    138 
    139 Guix:
    140 Designed for air-gapped reproducibility.
    141 You can export all sources via guix archive or guix pack.
    142 Build servers can remain offline and secure.
    143 
    144 Commercial Systems:
    145 Air-gap support is not native.
    146 Requires additional tooling for mirroring updates, verifying patches, and avoiding telemetry.
    147 Licensing and activation can be problematic offline.
    148 
    149 == Risk Mitigation in Classified Contexts
    150 
    151 Risk    Guix Mitigation RHEL/Windows Mitigation
    152 Supply chain tampering  Build everything from trusted source    Trust vendor signatures and processes
    153 Configuration drift     Fully declarative system + rollbacks    Ansible, Puppet, GPO
    154 Covert binaries / blobs Avoided by default (FOSS only)  Often required for hardware drivers, tools
    155 Forced updates / phones-home    None unless added by user       Needs group policy / firewall control
    156 
    157 == When to Use What?
    158 
    159 Choose Guix if:
    160 * You need maximum transparency and reproducibility.
    161 * You operate in a high-assurance, national security, or research environment.
    162 * You can tolerate a steeper learning curve and limited vendor support.
    163 
    164 Choose RHEL / Windows if:
    165 
    166 * You need certified support, pre-approved baselines, or are bound by specific compliance standards (e.g. NIST, CIS).
    167 * Your staff is trained in those ecosystems and you prioritize vendor backing over code transparency.
    168 * You're in regulated industry and want '''checkbox compliance''' with minimal friction.
    169 
    170 == Final Thoughts
    171 
    172 Guix System offers unparalleled control, auditability, and air-gap suitability, but requires organizational commitment and technical maturity.
    173 Commercial platforms offer smoother compliance workflows and official support, but at the cost of transparency and independence.